Zoning--Power of Zoning Board of Adjustment and the Vested Rights Rule in South Carolina by Taylor, Henry H.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 22 Issue 5 Article 8 
1970 
Zoning--Power of Zoning Board of Adjustment and the Vested 
Rights Rule in South Carolina 
Henry H. Taylor 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry H. Taylor, Zoning--Power of Zoning Board of Adjustment and the Vested Rights Rule in South 
Carolina, 22 S. C. L. Rev. 833 (1970). 
This Note is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
ZONING-POWER OF ZONING BOARD
OF ADJUSTMENT AND THE VESTED RIGHTS
RULE IN SOUTH CAROLINA*
I. INTRODUCTION
Two threshold questions which necessarily confront the prop-
erty owner who is planning to convert his property to a partic-
ular use are:
1. What right has he to the issuance of a building permit for
a use expressly permitted under an existing zoning ordinance?
2. After incurring substantial expenses in reliance on the ex-
isting ordinance, what protection has he from a subsequently
enacted amendment prohibiting the contemplated use?
Prior to the recent case of Pure Oil Divison v. City of Co-
lumbia,' there was considerable uncertainty as to the proper
answers to these questions under South Carolina law2; there
was, moreover, a wide divergence of opinion in other jurisdic-
tions as to the proper resolution of these issues. The Pure Oil
court, however, has clarified the state of the law in South Caro-
lina as to this area of property law and has indicated the trend
which the court will follow in dealing with similar issues in the
future. This comment will discuss the conflicting interests which
should be considered in answering these questions, positions
taken by other jurisdictions, and the law in South Carolina both
prior and subsequent to the Pure Oil case.
II. Tim PURE Om, DEcisiox
The Pure Oil case presented a factual situation which encom-
passed both of the above issues. The respondent, the South
Carolina National Bank as trustee, had in its charge a parcel
of land situated on the northwestern corner of the intersection
of Trenholm Road and Belt Line Boulevard in the City of
Columbia. The zoning classification of this property was 0-4,
General Commercial, which expressly included gasoline filling
stations as a permitted use.3 This was the only property zoned
* Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E2d 140 (1970).
1. 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E2d 140 (1970).
2. See Note, Thi Building Permit and Reliance Thereon In South Caro-
lina, 21 S.C.L. RLv. 70 (1968).
r1olumbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance at 87 (1963).
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nonresidential within a radius of one mile. In 1968, the respond-
net bank began to implement a plan for the reorganization of
the property in order to utilize the corner lot for a filling sta-
tion. At the bank's expense, some of the existing buildings were
demolished and removed from the property, and other businesses
were relocated on the property. A lease was entered into with the
respondent, Pure Oil, which likewise incurred expense in pre-
paring plans and specifications for the proposed filling station.
After incurring these expenses and obligations, the respond-
ents applied for a building permit to the Zoning Administrator,
who concluded that the application was proper and approved it.
Prior to issuance of the permit, however, the appellants, who
resided in the adjoining residential areas, appealed to the Zon-
ing Board of Adjustment which reversed the Zoning Adminis-
trator and denied the permit. Thereafter, the respondents
appealed to the trial court which reversed the Board of Adjust-
ment and enjoined the appellant, the City of Columbia, from
enacting a zoning ordinance amendment inconsistent with the
respondents' planned use. On certiorari, the South Carolina
Supreme Court decided:
1. The Board of Adjustment had no authority to deny the
respondents a building permit for the use expressly permitted
by the existing zoning ordinance; and
2. The respondents, by substantially altering their positions
and incurring expenses and obligations in reliance upon the
existing zoning ordinance, though no permit had been issued,
acquired vested rights entitling them to issuance of the permit
as against the right of the municipality to amend the ordinance
so as to prohibit the contemplated use.
4
III. PowER or Tnm BOARD OF ADmUsTmENT
To DENY ExprnssLr Pm3nTxm UsEs
Nearly all zoning ordinances and enabling acts provide for
the creation and operation of a Zoning Board of Adjustment,
sometimes called the Board of Appeals.5 Since each zoning
4. The question of whether the trial court was correct in prohibiting the
City of Columbia from taking any action toward rezoning the property was
also at issue. Since the court found that the respondents had vested rights to
use the property for a filling station, the fact that the trial court may have
illegally enjoined the City from amending its zoning ordinance could not have
prejudicially affected the rights of any of the parties. The court, therefore,
only briefly and inconclusively considered this issue.
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ordinance may, however, determine differently the proper allo-
cation of powers to the Board of Adjustment, each case must be
treated individually.
6
In Pure Oil the court was called upon to decide whether the
Board of Adjustment had the authority to deny a landowner the
right to use his property for a purpose expressly permitted by
the zoning ordinance then in existence. One of the general
powers of the Board of Adjustment enumerated in section 47-
1009 of the South Carolina Code is as follows: "To hear and
decide appeals when it is alleged that there is error in any order,
requirement, decision or determination made by an administra-
tive official in the enforcement of this article or of any ordi-
nance adopted pursuant hereto".7 The appellants argued that
under this provision the Board of Adjustment in the exercise of
its quasi-judicial power could review a decision of the Zoning
Administrator to issue a building permit and reverse such deci-
sion if necessary for the furtherance of overall zoning objec-
tives, notwithstanding the fact that the use desired by the
applicants was expressly permitted under the zoning ordinance.
The appellants also pointed out that, under the Prohibited
Uses and Structures category of the zoning ordinance, the
Board of Adjustment is given the power to prohibit
[a]ny use which [it] upon appeal and after investigation
of similar uses elsewhere, shall find to be potentially
noxious, dangerous or offensive to persons in the dis-
trict or to those who pass on public ways by reason of
odor, smoke, noise, glare, fumes, gas, vibration, threat
of fire or explosion, emission of particulate matter,
radiation, interference with radio or television recep-
tion or likely for other reasons to be incompatible with
the character of the distrit.8
Since the filling station was definitely incompatible with the
surrounding neighborhood9 for many of the reasons quoted
6. Ordinarily the Zoning Board of Adjustment is described as a quasi-
judicial body with its duties generally falling into these categories: (1) inter-
pretation of the zoning ordinances; (2) the granting of "special use permits"
or "special exceptions"; and (3) the granting of "variances". Id.
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-1009 (1962).
8. Brief of Appellants at 10, Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C.
28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
9. Emphasis is added to the word, "neighborhood," because of its signifi-
cance in the court's interpretation of the word, "district." The court found
the words, "neighborhood" and "district," to have very distinct meanings. See
text at note 19 infra.
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above, the appellants contended that the Board of Adjustment
was expressly empowered to prohibit the use.
The court, rejecting these arguments, based its finding en-
tirely upon its holding in Niggel v. City of Coumbia,10 a case
decided on the same day as Pure Oil. With one exception, to be
pointed out later, the facts of Niggel were almost identical to
those of Pure Oil. Necessarily, the Pure Oil court's finding was
based upon answers to two questions:":
1. Does the Zoning Board of Adjustment under its general
powers have the authority to deny a use expressly permitted by
the existing zoning ordinance?
2. Does the Zoning Board of Adjustment have authority to
deny an expressly permitted use under its specific power to
deny a use which is "incompatible with the character of the
district?"
Identical questions were answered in NiggeZ and the court in
Pure Oil, considering the facts of the two cases to be identical,
merely adopted, without elaboration, the reasoning and answers
expressed in the ANiggeZ opinion.1
2
The first question was not squarely and directly answered in
NiggeZ. The court decided that the Zoning Board of Adjustment
has no general power to deny an expressly permitted use.' 3 This
answer is generally in accord with prior South Carolina law on
the point. The court, in Kerr v. City of Cormb7ia4 and Steven-
son v. Board of Adjustment,15 in less direct terms, answered a
similar question in essentially the same manner. In Stevenson
the court stated:
Since the Zoning Ordinance itself permits the opera-
tion of a day school within the zoned district . . . the
Board [of Adjustment] could not deny the right which
the Zoning Ordinance permitted.'0
The second question was one of more novel impression, and
the Niggel court managed to decide the case while reserving an
answer until later. The court in Niggel interpreted the term,
10. 254 S.C. 19, 173 S.E.2d 136 (1970).
11. Answers to these questions were necessary because of the arguments
offered by appellants. See Brief of Appellants, Pure Oil Div. v. City of
Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 173 S.E.2d 140 (1970).
12. 254 S.C. at 33, 173 S.E.2d at 142.
13. 254 S.C. at 23, 173 S.E2d at 138.
14. 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E.2d 364 (1958).
15. 230 S.C. 440, 96 S.E.2d 456 (1957).
16. Id. at 453-54, 96 S.E.2d at 463.
[Vol. 22
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"district," in the Prohibited Uses and Structures category of the
zoning ordinance' 7 to mean the immediate zoning "district" in
which the proposed use was to be located, rather than the "gen-
eral neighborhood" or "surrounding districts" interpretation
urged by the appellants.' s The court in NiggeZ explained its
interpretation as follows:
The Zoning Ordinance provides for the division of
the City of Columbia into districts with definite geo-
graphical limits, which are shown on an official zoning
map. The term, "district", as used in the Ordinance,
means the respective geographical areas into which the
City has been divided for zoning purposes. The prop-
erty of respondent lies in a clearly defined area which
has been classified or zoned as a commercial district.
The incompatibility of the proposed use of respondent's
property must be determined, under the clear terms of
the Ordinance, from the character of the district in
which it is situated and not by the character of the
surrounding districts. Any other construction would
render the zoning districts meaningless because it
would, in effect, confer upon the Board of Adjustment
the power to rezone any district in the City by deter-
mining incompatability with reference to the character
of the surrounding districts and not the district in
which the property involved is located. Clearly, the
Board of Adjustment has no authority to rezone. 19
Under this narrow construction it was only logical to conclude,
as the court did in NiggeZ, that the proposed filling station was
compatible with the immediate "district," since another filling
station already existed within the district. Clearly, the Board of
Adjustment had no power to deny, as incompatible with the
district, a use which already existed within the district. Under
the court's construction of the term, "district," the second ques-
tion, based on the facts of NiggeZ, became moot; and it was,
therefore, unnecessary for the court to decide whether the Board
of Adjustment has power to deny an expressly permitted use
which is in fact incompatible with the zoning district. The Pure
Oil court, by equating the facts of the two cases, was able to
adopt the NiggeZ reasoning and likewise expressed no direct
answer to the second question.
17. See Columbia, S.C., Zoning Ordinance at 89 (1963).
18. See text at note 9 mipra.
19. 254 S.C. at 23, 173 S.E2d at 138.
1970]
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It is important here to note a distinction between the facts in
Pure Oil and those in Niggel. The zoning district in Pure Oil
consisted of only apartments, a beauty shop, and a dry cleaning
pick up station, while the district in Niggel contained, along
with other commercial uses, an existing filling station immedi-
ately across the street from the proposed site of the new filling
station. With this distinction in mind, it was conceivable in Pure
Oil that, even under the Niggel court's narrow construction of
the term, "district", the proposed filling station was incompati-
ble with the immediate "district", which contained only apart-
ments, a beauty shop, and a dry cleaning pick-up station. The
Pure Oil decision, by equating the facts of the two cases, passed
over this possibility without mention. One can only speculate as
to the court's reasons for so doing. Assuming that it was not an
inadvertent error by the court, it would seem that the intent was
to allow the respondents to prevail in Pure Oil, where incom-
patability with the zoning district would have been difficult to
justify, without handcuffing the Board of Adjustment in the
future by expressly holding that the Board of Adjustment has
no power to deny an expressly permitted use even though it is
clearly incompatible with the zoning district. Possibly, the court
conceived of factual situations in which the Board's express
power to deny an incompatible use would be justified and neces-
sary and was, therefore, reluctant to destroy this power ex-
pressly.
In holding that the Board of Adjustment has no general
powers to deny an expressly permitted use, the South Carolina
court seems to be in accord with the majority of other jurisdic-
tions. 20 It is admitted that a contrary holding would have the
effect of conferring upon the Board of Adjustment the power
to amend zoning laws, which is a function of the proper legisla-
tive body. But, on the other hand, denying the Board of Adjust-
ment the specific power to refuse to permit a use clearly incom-
patible with the immediate "district" could have a detrimental
effect upon the overall objectives of zoning. This part of the
question apparently remains unanswered in South Carolina.
IV. VESTED RIGHTS RuIM nq SoUTH CAROLINA
A nonconforming use has been defined as a use which law-
fully existed at the enactment of a zoning ordinance or amend-
ment and which is maintained after the effective date of the
20. See 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 9-3 (3d ed. 1965) [herein-
after cited as YoKLEY].
[Vol. 2"2.
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ordinance or amendment although it does not comply with the
new use restrictions applicable to the area in which it is situ-
ated.21 In order to make zoning ordinances and amendments
politically, economically, and constitutionally feasible, it has
been necessary to allow nonconforming uses to continue in exist-
ence subject to long range plans designed to effect their elimina-
tion.2 2 This allowance of nonconforming uses applies to uses
which are in various stages of development when a new ordi-
nance or amendment is enacted. When the development has
reached a certain stage, the property owner is said to have
acquired a "vested right" to continue the development and sub-
sequently to put the use to its intended function.23 The point in
the development of the use at which time the property owner
is said to have acquired a "protected use" or "vested right" is
not easily defined and can present a very perplexing problem
for the lawyer.24 The Pure Oil decision is particularly signifi-
cant as it relates to the question of when a right to continue
a nonconforming use vests.
The courts have generally held that, where a building permit
has once been granted by an officer authorized to issue it and
the permittee has acted in reliance thereon and incurred ex-
penses, the right to continue construction under such a permit
becomes a "vested right" which the municipality has no right to
violate by revocation of the permit or subsequent amendment to
the zoning ordinance.25 Under this general rule the property
owner must not only have a valid building permit but must also
have incurred substantial expenses in actual construction.26
What constitutes "substantial expenses" is debatable, but the
rule that the issuance of a building permit alone confers no
"vested right" is well settled.27
Notwithstanding the general rule that the issuance of a build-
ing permit is necessary to acquire "vested rights," there is a
current trend in decisions which indicates that "vested rights"
may be acquired where, in reliance on the existing ordinance,
expenses are incurred in preparing for and seeking the issuance
of a permit.28 This emerging trend has the effect of conferring
21. 1 ANrDEasoN, AmRCAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.01 (1968).
22. GOODMAN, supra note 5, at 435.
23. See generally 1 YoKLEY, supra note 20, § 9-5 et seq.
24. See INTRODUcrIoN, supra.
25. 1 YoKY, supra note 20, § 9-5.
26. 1 YoxLEY, snpra note 20, at 407.
27. Note, The Building Permit and Reliance Thereon In South Carolina,
supra note 2, at 76.
28. 1 YOKLEY, supra note 20, at 409.
1970]
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a vested right at a very early stage in the development of a use.
In Pure Oil, the court became one of the forerunners in the
adoption of this emerging rule by stating:
We see no sound reason to protect vested rights
acquired after a permit is issued, and to deny such pro-
tection to similar rights acquired under an ordinance
as it existed at the time a proper application for a
permit is made. In both instances, the right protected is
the same, that is, the good faith reliance by the owner
on the right to use his property as permitted under the
Zoning Ordinance in force at the time of the applica-
tion for a permit ....
In accordance with the then existing zoning ordi-
nance, respondents were entitled to a permit to con-
struct and operate a filling station on the lot in ques-
tion; and its issuance could not be legally denied, even
under a subsequently enacted ordinance prohibiting
such use, so as to deprive the owner of the vested rights
acquired.29
Prior to Pure Oil, there seems to have been no clearly deline-
ated "vested right" rule in South Carolina, 0 in spite of several
decisions which were based on a "vested right" concept.31 The
South Carolina courts apparently looked to the public interest
protected by the new ordinance or subsequent amendment rather
than to a definite "vested right" concept.32 For example, in
Douglas v. City Council of Greenville3" the court held that a
proper ordinance restricting the location of livery stables was
not invalid as to one who had bought a lot and commenced
building operations at considerable expense before the ordinance
was adopted. Compare Kerr v. City of Columbia3 4 where the
court held that a substantial change of position in reliance on
the existing ordinance may confer a right to establish a use
inconsistent with a subsequently adopted zoning ordinance. The
two cases can only be reconciled by considering public health
and safety interests.
29. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.E.2d at 143.
30. Note, The Building Permit and Reliance Thereon In, South Carolina,
supra note 2, at 78.
31. E.g., Pendleton v. City of Columbia, 209 S.C. 394, 40 S.E.2d 499 (1946)
and Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S.C. 266, 20 S.E.2d 699 (1942).
32. Note, The Building Permit and Reliance Thereon In South Carolina,
supra note 2, at 78.
33. 92 S.C. 374, 75 S.E. 687 (1912).
34. 232 S.C. 405, 102 S.E2d 364 (1958).
[Vol. 29
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In retrospect, the Kerr case seems to have been handwriting
on the wall. 5 However, the complexity of the facts in Kerr and
the severity of the damages which would have befallen the
property owner if the court had decided otherwise threw a cloud
of uncertainty over the decision.36 The decision apparently was
based upon equity principles rather than upon the law of
zoning. The court subsequently relied heavily upon Kerr in its
Pure Oil decision; 37 the court thus indicated that the intent in
Ker was to establish a "vested right" rule similar to the one
clearly adopted in Pure Oil.
Exception to the "vested right" rule of Pure Oil apparently
still exists in the interest of public necessity.38 In Pure Oil, the
appellants pointed out that there was considerable traffic con-
gestion, evidenced by a high accident rate and the recent widen-
ing of the street, existing at the intersection where the filling
station was to be located and that increased congestion and acci-
dents, caused by vehicles turning into the station, would cause
danger to persons traveling by the intersection and to small
children going to and from a park located nearby. There also
existed the possibility of contamination to a stream running
behind the proposed site of the filling station. Furthermore, the
residential area surrounding the proposed site had a history of
very stable property values. The appellants argued that the loca-
tion of a filling station in this area would cause the area to lose
its residential character and that property values would likely
decline.39 These arguments failed to arouse any feeling of public
necessity among the justices. The court succinctly stated: "There
are no intervening considerations of public necessity involved
under the facts of this case."40 The degree of public necessity
required to circumvent the "vested right" rule laid down in
Pure Oil remains undetermined, but it is apparent from this case
that the necessity must be extensive.
35. See W. LEDB TTER, JR., ZONING LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 43 (1970).
36. This is apparent from the fact that the appellants in Pure Oil were
willing to pursue their case to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
37. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.E2d at 143.
38. The court has always qualified its "vested rights" holdings by stating
that such rights cannot be deprived without cause or in the absence of public
necessity. See, e.g., Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28, 34, 173
S.E.2d 140, 143 (1970).
,39. See generally Record, Pure Oil Div. v. City of Columbia, 254 S.C. 28,
173 S.E2d 140 (1970).
40. 254 S.C. at 34, 173 S.E2d at 143.
1970]
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V. CONCLUSION
Zoning controversies between individual property owners and
municipalities or surrounding property owners often boil down
to the protection of individual property rights on one side and
the protection, promotion, and maintenance of public welfare
on the other. The legislature and the courts must establish and
maintain a delicate balance between the two. Such was the situa-
tion confronting the court in the Pure Oil case. The respondents,
the South Carolina National Bank and Pure Oil, in the exercise
of their right to control the property, incurred expenses in
preparing the property for an expressly permitted use under
the existing Zoning Ordinance; apparently, their actions were
in good faith. Thereafter, the appellants, the City of Columbia
and the surrounding property owners, realized that the use con-
templated by the respondents was very likely to be detrimental
to the general welfare of the surrounding neighborhood. The
zoning plan for the area had originated in an earlier time, when
the scarceness of speedy transportation was such that neighbor-
hood commercial districts were essential. Apparently, the pos-
sible effects of the zoning plan on a modern residential area had
not been thoroughly considered prior to Pure Oil, since no action
had been taken to alleviate the problem through amendment to
the zoning ordinance.
In summary, it is now settled law in South Carolina that (1)
the Zoning Board of Adjustment has no authority to deny a use
expressly permitted under an existing zoning ordinance and (2)
where property owners substantially alter their position and
incur expenses and obligations in reliance upon the existing
zoning ordinance, they acquire "vested rights" as against a
subsequent zoning amendment even if no building permit has
been issued. These rules of law establish rights of property
owners at an early stage of property development and thereby
greatly increase the lawyer's ability to advise a client of his
rights.
Recognizing "vested rights" at an early stage admittedly
results in less risk to landowners, but it tends to perpetuate the
problems that zoning is intended to eliminate.4 1 "Vested rights"
will often be conferred before zoning officials and surrounding
property owners are aware that an undesirable use is being
41. See W. L-EDrziER, JR., supra note 35, Chapter V, for an excellent dis-
cussion of zoning objectives.
[Vol. 22
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planned.42 A subsequently enacted amendment can only have the
effect of "closing the gate after the horse has escaped."
One writer has praised the Pure Oil case as follows:
While these cases [Pure Oil and Kerr] seem to be
against the weight of authority in this country, they are
more equitable to the individual property owner and
generate more confidence in government than do the
decisions which decline to find a vested right except
where a valid building permit has been issued and there
has been substantial reliance thereon. As someone has
said: "Men naturally trust in their government, and
ought to do so, and ought not to suffer for it.
'
43
It is, however, submitted that individual property owners should
not have an exclusive right to "trust in their government."
Should such "trust" not be equally applicable to surrounding
property owners who see their welfare endangered and their
property values depreciated because of an obsolete zoning ordi-
nance enacted and administered by a government with whom
they have entrusted their welfare? Perhaps it would be better
to adhere to the majority rule, requiring a building permit and
substantial reliance thereon, for acquiring "vested rights,"
thereby delaying a decision on allowing the use until the appro-
priate officials have investigated the planned use. Is this not
more equitable to all concerned?
MNmmy H. TAYLoR
42. This seems to be precisely the situation in the Pure Oil case.
43. W. LmED , J., .supra note 35, at 43.
1970]
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